

Scuola Estiva di Logica, Gargnano, 31 agosto - 6 settembre 2008

# LOGIC AT WORK

## Formal Verification of Complex Systems via Symbolic Model Checking

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# Content

- ⇒ **Motivations and Goals** . . . . .
- Representing transition systems as Kripke Models . . . . .
- Representing properties as temporal logic formulas . . . . .
- CTL Model Checking: general ideas . . . . .
- Symbolic CTL Model Checking . . . . .
- Conclusions, state of the art & research developments . . . . .

# Problems in Developing IT Systems

- ▷ increasing dependability
  - everything important depends on computers (industrial production, banking, stock market, transport,...)  
⇒ quality is essential
- ▷ systems increasingly complex
  - Moore law: exponential growth  
( $10^{30}$  transistors/processor, multi million LOC's/OS)  
⇒ cost for testing is exploding
- ▷ time-to-market affects potential revenue dramatically:
  - 1 week delay for a microprocessor  
⇒ loss of more than 20.000.000 US\$ (year 2004)

# Critical Systems

- ▷ **Safety-critical:**  
systems whose failure can cause life losses or serious environmental damage  
(e.g., trains & planes control, nuclear plants control, ...)
- ▷ **Mission-critical:**  
systems whose failure can cause the failure of the goals of important missions  
(e.g., space craft navigation)
- ▷ **Business-critical:**  
systems whose failure can cause the loss of big or huge amounts of money  
(e.g., bank management software, operating systems)

## A paradigmatic catastrophe: the PENTIUM-IV Bug

- ▷ in 1994 Professor Thomas Nicely from Lynchburg College in Virginia discovered incorrect behaviors in the Pentium chip.
- ▷ Cause: a design error in the floating point division algorithm in the ALU.
- ▷ The chip was withdrawn and substituted by Intel.
- ▷ 450 US\$ millions lost!
- ▷ Since 1994, Intel adopts formal methods!
- ▷ Others famous catastrophes due to bugged systems:
  - The Therac-25 case, 1985 (4 people killed, 2 injured)
  - The Ariane-5 case, 1996 (500M US\$ lost)
  - The Russian ATM case, 2006 (2Billion rubles wrongly credited)
  - ...
- ▷ Formal methods now mandatorily required by most international agencies for safety-critical applications.

# Formal Verification

Problem: given a specification  $S$ , and a model  $M$  (system/program/circuit), check that  $M$  verifies  $S$ :  $M \models S$

- ▷ Most important in HW and protocols (but increasingly used in SW)
- ▷ Exhaustive verification
- ▷ Approaches: theorem proving, equivalence checking, model checking

# Model Checking

- ▷ F.V. by **exhaustive search** over the state space.
- ▷ Systems modeled as **Finite State Machines  $M$**  (Kripke models)
- ▷ Properties expressed with a formal representation  $\Psi$   
(e.g Temporal Logic, Automata, MSCs, etc.).  
 $\implies$  Precise, unambiguous semantics
- ▷ Verification via **logical reasoning**:

$$M \models \Psi$$


Is  $M$  a **logical model** for  $\Psi$ ?

- **Yes**  $\implies$  the system verifies the property
- **No**  $\implies$  a counter-example is returned  
(representing an execution leading to a bug).

# Model Checking (cont.)

temporal formula

$G(p \rightarrow Fq)$




finite-state model

Model  
Checker

yes!


no!



counterexample



# Extending the traditional development process with M.C.



## Industrial Success of Model Checking

- ▷ **Powerful debugging capabilities:**
  - helps detecting problems in early stages of the development cycle
  - exhaustive, thus effective
  - provides counterexamples (directs the designer to the problem).
- ▷ **can be integrated within industrial development cycle:**
  - compilers for practical design languages  
(e.g., VHDL, VERILOG, Esterel, SDL, StateCharts, SMV, Promela,...);
- ▷ **Who is using it?**
  - Design teams: Intel, AMD, IBM, Microsoft, Lucent, ...
  - CAD tool vendors: Cadence, Synopsis,...
  - Commercial model checkers: FormalCheck (IBM), SLAM (Microsoft), ...
- ▷ **Does not require deep training** (“push-button” technology).

“... formal verification has now entered the critical path in the process of development of a microprocessor” [Bob Bentley, Intel, CAV'2005]

## Model Checking: State-of-the-art

- ▷ Well-founded theory and algorithms
- ▷ Robust and well-established tools (e.g. VIS, SPIN, COSPAN, NuSMV, Uppaal)
- ▷ Very successful for verifying
  - medium-size “isolated” hardware
  - protocols
- ▷ increasingly used for verifying software (e.g., Microsoft)
- ▷ increasingly popular in industry

## Model Checking: Awards

▷ **Amir Pnueli**: **ACM Turing Award 1996**

“For his seminal work introducing temporal logic into computing science and for outstanding contributions to program and system verification.”

▷ **Gerard J. Holzmann, Robert P. Kurshan, Moshe Y. Vardi, and Pierre Wolper**: **ACM Kanellakis Award 2006**

“... demonstrated that checking the correctness of reactive systems can be achieved using a mathematical analysis of abstract machines.”

▷ **Edmund Clarke, E. Allen Emerson and Joseph Sifakis**:  
**ACM Turing Award 2007**

“... In recognition of their pioneering work on an automated method for finding design errors in computer hardware and software [Model Checking]”

# Content


- ✓ Motivations and Goals . . . . .
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  - Representing properties as temporal logic formulas . . . . .
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## Modeling the system: Kripke models


- ▷ **Kripke models** are used to describe **reactive systems**:
  - nonterminating systems with infinite behaviors (e.g. communication protocols, hardware circuits);
  - represent the **dynamic evolution** of modeled systems;
  - a state includes values to state variables, program counters, content of communication channels.
  - **can be animated and validated before their actual implementation**

## Kripke model: definition

- ▷ Formally, a Kripke model  $\langle S, I, R, AP, L \rangle$  consists of
- a set of states  $S$ ;
  - a set of initial states  $I \subseteq S$ ;
  - a set of transitions  $R \subseteq S \times S$ ;
  - a set of atomic propositions  $AP$ ;
  - a labeling function  $L \subseteq S \times AP$ .



# Example: a Kripke model for mutual exclusion



N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2




# Path in a Kripke Model

- ▷ An **path** (execution) in a Kripke model  $M$  is an **infinite** sequence of states

$$\pi = s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots$$

such that  $s_0 \in I$  and  $(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in R, \forall i$ .

- ▷ A state  $s$  is **reachable** in  $M$  if there is a path from the initial states to  $s$ .




## Composing Kripke Models

- Complex Kripke Models are typically obtained by composition of smaller ones
- Components can be combined via
  - **asynchronous** composition.
  - **synchronous** composition,

# Asynchronous Composition


- ▷ Interleaving of evolution of components.
- ▷ At each time instant, one component is selected to perform a transition.



- ▷ Typical example: communication protocols.

# Synchronous Composition

- ▷ Components evolve in parallel.
- ▷ At each time instant, every component performs a transition.



- ▷ Typical example: sequential hardware circuits.

## Description languages for Kripke Model

- Typically a Kripke model is not given explicitly, rather it is usually presented in a structured language (e.g., SMV, SDL, PROMELA, StateCharts, VHDL, ...)
- Each component is presented by specifying
  - **state variables**: determine the set of atomic propositions  $AP$ , the state space  $S$  and the labeling  $L$ .
  - **initial values for state variables**: determine the set of initial states  $I$ .
  - **instructions**: determine the transition relation  $R$ .

Remark: typically these description are much more compact (and intuitive) than the explicit representation of the Kripke model.

# The SMV language

- ▷ The input language of the SMV M.C. (and NuSMV)
- ▷ Booleans, enumerative and bounded integers as data types (now enriched with other constructs)
- ▷ An SMV program consists of:
  - Declarations of the state variables (e.g., `b0`);
  - Assignments that define the valid initial states (e.g., `init (b0) := 0`).
  - Assignments that define the transition relation (e.g., `next (b0) := !b0`).
- ▷ Allows for both synchronous and asynchronous composition of modules (though synchronous interaction more natural)

# The SMV language: example

Example: The modulo 4 counter with reset

```


MODULE main
VAR
  b0      : boolean;
  b1      : boolean;
  reset   : boolean;
  out     : 0..3;

ASSIGN
  init(b0) := 0;
  next(b0) := case
    reset = 1 : 0;
    reset = 0 : !b0;
  esac;

  init(b1) := 0;
  next(b1) := case
    reset = 1 : 0;
    reset = 0 : (b0 xor b1);
  esac;

  out := b0 + 2*b1;

```



## The PROMELA language

- ▷ PROMELA (Process Meta Language) is the modeling language of the M.C. SPIN
- ▷ The syntax is C-like
- ▷ A system in PROMELA consists of a set of *processes* that interact by means of:
  - *shared variables*
  - *communication channels*
    - rendez-vous communications
    - buffered communications
- ▷ Processes can be created dynamically
- ▷ Allows for both synchronous and asynchronous composition of processes (though asynchronous interaction more natural)



# The PROMELA language: example

## Example: A Mutual Exclusion Algorithm


```

bool turn;
bool flag[2];

proctype User(bool pid) {
  flag[pid] = 1;
  turn = 1-pid;
  (flag[1-pid] == 0 || turn == pid);
  /* Begin of critical section */
  ...
  /* End of critical section */
  flag[pid] = 0;
}

init { run User(0); run User(1) }

```



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# Temporal Logics





- ▷ Express properties of Reactive Systems
  - nonterminating behaviours,
  - without explicit reference to time.
- ▷ Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
  - interpreted over **each path** of the Kripke structure
  - linear model of time
  - temporal operators
- ▷ Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
  - interpreted over the **computation tree** of Kripke model
  - branching model of time
  - temporal operators plus path quantifiers

## Linear Temporal Logic (LTL): intuitions

LTL is given by the standard boolean logic enhanced with the following temporal operators:

- ▷ “**Next**” **X**:  $\mathbf{X}\varphi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\varphi$  is true in  $s_{t+1}$
- ▷ “**Finally**” (or “eventually”) **F**:  $\mathbf{F}\varphi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\varphi$  is true in **some**  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
- ▷ “**Globally**” (or “henceforth”) **G**:  $\mathbf{G}\varphi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\varphi$  is true in **all**  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
- ▷ “**Until**” **U**:  $\varphi\mathbf{U}\psi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff
  - $\psi$  is true in some state  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
  - $\varphi$  is true in all states  $s_{t''}$  with  $t \leq t'' < t'$

## LTL: intuitions

finally  $P$  $F P$ globally  $P$  $G P$ next  $P$  $X P$  $P$  until  $q$  $P U q$

## Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL): Syntax

- ▷ An **atomic proposition** is a LTL formula;
- ▷ if  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  are LTL formulae, then  $\neg\varphi_1$ ,  $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$  are LTL formulae;
- ▷ if  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  are LTL formulae, then  $\mathbf{X}\varphi_1$ ,  $\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2$ ,  $\mathbf{G}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{F}\varphi_1$  are LTL formulae, where  $\mathbf{X}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}$ ,  $\mathbf{F}$ ,  $\mathbf{U}$  are the “next”, “globally”, “eventually”, “until” temporal operators respectively.

N.B: LTL can be defined in terms of  $\wedge$ ,  $\neg$ ,  $\mathbf{X}$ ,  $\mathbf{U}$  only:

- ▷  $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 := \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \wedge \neg\varphi_2)$ ,  $\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2 := (\neg\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2)$ ,  
 $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 := (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge (\varphi_2 \rightarrow \varphi_1)$
- ▷  $\mathbf{F}\varphi_1 := \top \mathbf{U}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{G}\varphi_1 := \neg\mathbf{F}\neg\varphi_1$ ,  $\neg\mathbf{X}\varphi_1 := \mathbf{X}\neg\varphi_1$
- ▷ N.B.  $\varphi_1 \mathbf{R}\varphi_2 := \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\neg\varphi_2)$ , “Releases”

# LTL: Formal Semantics

$\pi, s_i \models a$	iff	$a \in L(s_i)$
$\pi, s_i \models \neg\varphi$	iff	$\pi, s_i \not\models \varphi$
$\pi, s_i \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	$\pi, s_i \models \varphi$ and $\pi, s_i \models \psi$
$\pi, s_i \models \mathbf{X}\varphi$	iff	$\pi, s_{i+1} \models \varphi$
$\pi, s_i \models \mathbf{F}\varphi$	iff	for some $j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \varphi$
$\pi, s_i \models \mathbf{G}\varphi$	iff	for all $j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \varphi$
$\pi, s_i \models \varphi \mathbf{U} \psi$	iff	for some $j \geq i : \pi, s_j \models \psi$ and for all $i \leq k < j : \pi, s_k \models \varphi$

## LTL: Some Noteworthy Examples

- ▷ **Safety:** “it never happens that a train is arriving and the bar is up”

$$\mathbf{G}(\neg(\text{train\_arriving} \wedge \text{bar\_up}))$$

- ▷ **Liveness:** “if input, then eventually output”

$$\mathbf{G}(\text{input} \rightarrow \mathbf{F}\text{output})$$

- ▷ **Fairness:** “infinitely often send ”

$$\mathbf{GF}\text{send}$$

- ▷ **Strong fairness:** “infinitely often send implies infinitely often recv.”

$$\mathbf{GF}\text{send} \rightarrow \mathbf{GF}\text{recv}$$



# Model Checking in LTL

- ▷ LTL properties are evaluated over paths, i.e., over infinite, linear sequences of states:



$$\pi = s_0 \rightarrow s_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow s_t \rightarrow s_{t+1} \rightarrow \dots$$

- ▷ Given an infinite sequence  $\pi = s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots$

- $\pi, s_i \models \phi$  if  $\phi$  is true in state  $s_i$  of  $\pi$ .
- $\pi \models \phi$  if  $\phi$  is true in the initial state  $s_0$  of  $\pi$ .

- ▷ The LTL model checking problem  $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$

- check if  $\pi \models \phi$  for every path  $\pi$  of the Kripke structure  $\mathcal{M}$  (e.g.,  $\phi = \mathbf{F}done$ )



## LTL tableaux rules

▷ Let  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  be LTL formulae:

$$\mathbf{F}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \vee \mathbf{X}\mathbf{F}\varphi_1)$$


$$\mathbf{G}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{X}\mathbf{G}\varphi_1)$$

$$\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2 \iff (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{X}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)))$$

▷ If applied recursively, rewrite an LTL formula in terms of atomic and  $\mathbf{X}$ -formulas:


$$(p\mathbf{U}q) \wedge (\mathbf{G}\neg p) \implies (q \vee (p \wedge \mathbf{X}(p\mathbf{U}q))) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \mathbf{X}\mathbf{G}\neg p)$$

# Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety)



$$M \models G \neg (C_1 \wedge C_2) ?$$


# Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) [cont.]



$$M \models \mathbf{G}\neg(C_1 \wedge C_2) ?$$


**YES:** There is no reachable state in which  $(C_1 \wedge C_2)$  holds!

# Example 2: liveness



$M \models FC_1 ?$


## Example 2: liveness [cont.]



$$M \models FC_1 ?$$


**NO:** there is an infinite cyclic solution in which  $C_1$  never holds!

# Example 3: liveness



$$M \models \mathbf{G}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{FC}_1) ?$$

# Example 3: liveness [cont.]




$$M \models \mathbf{G}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{FC}_1) ?$$

**YES:** every path starting from each state where  $T_1$  holds passes through a state where  $C_1$  holds




# Example 4: fairness



$M \models \text{GFC}_1 ?$


# Example 4: fairness [cont.]



$M \models \text{GFC}_1 ?$


**NO:** e.g., in the initial state, there is an infinite cyclic solution in which  $C_1$  never holds!

# Example 5: strong fairness



$$M \models \mathbf{GFT}_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{GFC}_1 ?$$

## Example 5: strong fairness [cont.]



$$M \models \mathbf{GFT}_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{GFC}_1 ?$$









**YES:** every path which visits  $T_1$  infinitely often also visits  $C_1$  infinitely often (see liveness property of previous example).

## Computation Tree Logic (CTL): intuitions

CTL is given by the standard boolean logic enhanced with the operators **AX**, **AG**, **AF**, **AU**, **EX**, **EG**, **EF**, **EU**:

- ▷ “**Necessarily Next**” **AX**: **AX** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  is true in every successor state  $s_{t+1}$
- ▷ “**Possibly Next**” **EX**: **EX** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  is true in one successor state  $s_{t+1}$
- ▷ “**Necessarily in the future**” (or “Inevitably”) **AF**: **AF** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  is inevitably true in **some**  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
- ▷ “**Possibly in the future**” (or “Possibly”) **EF**: **EF** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  may be true in **some**  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
- ▷ “**Globally**” (or “always”) **AG**: **AG** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  is true in **all**  $s_{t'}$  with  $t' \geq t$
- ▷ “**Possibly henceforth**” **EG**: **EG** $\phi$  is true in  $s_t$  iff  $\phi$  is possibly true henceforth
- ▷ “**Necessarily Until**” **AU**: **A**( $\phi$ **U** $\psi$ ) is true in  $s_t$  iff necessarily  $\phi$  holds until  $\psi$  holds.
- ▷ “**Possibly Until**” **EU**: **E**( $\phi$ **U** $\psi$ ) is true in  $s_t$  iff possibly  $\phi$  holds until  $\psi$  holds.

## CTL: intuitions [cont.]

finally  $P$  $AF P$ globally  $P$  $AG P$ next  $P$  $AX P$  $P$  until  $q$  $A[ P U q ]$  $EF P$  $EG P$  $EX P$  $E[ P U q ]$

## Computation Tree Logic (CTL): Syntax

- ▷ An **atomic proposition** is a CTL formula;
- ▷ if  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  are CTL formulae, then  $\neg\varphi_1$ ,  $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ ,  $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$  are CTL formulae;
- ▷ if  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  are CTL formulae, then  **$\mathbf{AX}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{A}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)$ ,  $\mathbf{AG}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{AF}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{EX}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{E}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)$ ,  $\mathbf{EG}\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{EF}\varphi_1$** , are CTL formulae.

N.B: CTL can be defined in terms of  $\wedge$ ,  $\neg$ ,  **$\mathbf{EX}$ ,  $\mathbf{EG}$ ,  $\mathbf{EU}$**  only:

- ▷  $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 := \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \wedge \neg\varphi_2)$ ,  $\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2 := (\neg\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2)$ ,  
 $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 := (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge (\varphi_2 \rightarrow \varphi_1)$
- ▷  **$\mathbf{A}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2) := \neg\mathbf{E}(\neg\varphi_2 \mathbf{U}(\neg\varphi_1 \wedge \neg\varphi_2)) \wedge \neg\mathbf{EG}\neg\varphi_2$ ,  $\mathbf{EF}\varphi_1 := \mathbf{E}(\top \mathbf{U}\varphi_1)$ ,  
 $\mathbf{AG}\varphi_1 := \neg\mathbf{EF}\neg\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{AF}\varphi_1 := \neg\mathbf{EG}\neg\varphi_1$ ,  $\mathbf{AX}\varphi_1 := \neg\mathbf{EX}\neg\varphi_1$**

## CTL Formal Semantics

Let  $(s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots)$  be a path outgoing from state  $s_i$  in  $M$

$$M, s_i \models a \quad \text{iff} \quad a \in L(s_i)$$

$$M, s_i \models \neg\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad M, s_i \not\models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models \varphi \vee \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad M, s_i \models \varphi \text{ or } M, s_i \models \psi$$

$$M, s_i \models AX\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad s_{i+1} \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models EX\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for some } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad s_{i+1} \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models AG\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for all } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models EG\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for some } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for all } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models AF\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for some } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models EF\varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for some } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for some } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \varphi$$



$$M, s_i \models A(\varphi U \psi) \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for some } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \psi \text{ and} \\ \text{for all } i \leq k < j : M, s_k \models \varphi$$

$$M, s_i \models E(\varphi U \psi) \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for some } (s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots), \quad \text{for some } j \geq i : M, s_j \models \psi \text{ and} \\ \text{for all } i \leq k < j : M, s_k \models \varphi$$



# Model Checking in CTL

- ▶ CTL properties (e.g.  $\mathbf{AF}done$ ) are evaluated over computation trees.



- ▶ Every temporal operator ( $\mathbf{F}$ ,  $\mathbf{G}$ ,  $\mathbf{X}$ ,  $\mathbf{U}$ ) preceded by a path quantifier ( $\mathbf{A}$  or  $\mathbf{E}$ ).
- ▶ Universal modalities ( $\mathbf{AF}$ ,  $\mathbf{AG}$ ,  $\mathbf{AX}$ ,  $\mathbf{AU}$ ): the temporal formula is true in **all** the paths starting in the current state.
- ▶ Existential modalities ( $\mathbf{EF}$ ,  $\mathbf{EG}$ ,  $\mathbf{EX}$ ,  $\mathbf{EU}$ ): the temporal formula is true in **some** path starting in the current state.

Model Checking in CTL,  $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$ :

Check if  $\mathcal{M}, s \models \phi$  for every initial state  $s \in I$  of the Kripke structure  $\mathcal{M}$

## CTL tableaux rules

▷ Let  $\varphi_1$  and  $\varphi_2$  be CTL formulae:

$$\mathbf{AF}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \vee \mathbf{AXAF}\varphi_1)$$

$$\mathbf{AG}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{AXAG}\varphi_1)$$

$$\mathbf{A}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2) \iff (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{AXA}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)))$$

$$\mathbf{EF}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \vee \mathbf{EXEF}\varphi_1)$$

$$\mathbf{EG}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{EXEG}\varphi_1)$$


$$\mathbf{E}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2) \iff (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{EXE}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)))$$

▷ Recursive definitions of **AF**, **AG**, **AU**, **EF**, **EG**, **EU**.

▷ If applied recursively, rewrite a CTL formula in terms of atomic, **AX**- and **EX**-formulas:


$$\mathbf{A}(p\mathbf{U}q) \wedge (\mathbf{EG}\neg p) \implies (q \vee (p \wedge \mathbf{AXA}(p\mathbf{U}q))) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \mathbf{EXEG}\neg p)$$

# Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety)



$$M \models \mathbf{AG} \neg (C_1 \wedge C_2) ?$$

# Example 1: mutual exclusion (safety) [cont.]




$$M \models \mathbf{AG} \neg (C_1 \wedge C_2) ?$$


**YES:** There is no reachable state in which  $(C_1 \wedge C_2)$  holds!

(Same as the  $\mathbf{G} \neg (C_1 \wedge C_2)$  in LTL.)

# Example 2: liveness




## Example 2: liveness [cont.]



**YES:** every path starting from each state where  $T_1$  holds passes through a state where  $C_1$  holds


(Same as  $\mathbf{G}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{FC}_1)$  in LTL.)

# Example 3: fairness



$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ?$

# Example 3: fairness [cont.]




$$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ?$$

**NO:** e.g., in the initial state, there is an infinite cyclic solution in which  $C_1$  never holds!


(Same as  $\text{GFC}_1$  in LTL.)



# Example 4: blocking [cont.]




# Example 4: blocking [cont.]



**YES:** from each state where  $N_1$  holds there is a path leading to a state where  $T_1$  holds  
(No corresponding LTL formula.)

## LTL vs. CTL: expressiveness

- ▷ many CTL formulas cannot be expressed in LTL  
(e.g., those containing existentially quantified subformulas)  
E.g., **AG**( $N_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{EFT}_1$ ), **AFAG** $\phi$
- ▷ many LTL formulas cannot be expressed in CTL  
(e.g. fairness LTL formulas)  
E.g., **GFT** $T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{GFC}_1$ , **FG** $\phi$
- ▷ some formulas can be expressed both in LTL and in CTL (typically LTL formulas with operators of nesting depth 1, and/or with operators occurring positively)  
E.g., **G** $\neg(C_1 \wedge C_2)$ , **FC** $T_1$ , **G**( $T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{FC}_1$ ), **GFC** $T_1$



## LTL vs. CTL: M.C. Algorithms

- ▷ LTL M.C. problems are typically handled with **automata-based M.C.** approaches (Wolper & Vardi)
- ▷ CTL M.C. problems are typically handled with **symbolic M.C.** approaches (Clarke & McMillan)
- ▷ LTL M.C. problems can be reduced to CTL M.C. problems under **fairness constraints** (Clarke et al.)


# Content

- ✓ Motivations and Goals . . . . .
- ✓ Representing transition systems as Kripke Models . . . . .
- ✓ Representing properties as temporal logic formulas . . . . .
- ⇒ CTL Model Checking: general ideas . . . . .
  - Symbolic CTL Model Checking . . . . .
  - Conclusions, state of the art & research developments . . . . .

# CTL Model Checking

CTL Model Checking is a formal verification technique where...

- ...the system is represented as Finite State Machine  $M$ :



- ...the property is expressed a CTL formula  $\varphi$ :

$$\mathbf{AG}(p \rightarrow \mathbf{AF}q)$$

- ...the model checking algorithm checks whether all the executions of the model satisfy the formula ( $M \models \varphi$ ).

## CTL Model Checking: General Idea

### Two macro-steps:

1. construct the set of states where the formula holds:

$$[\varphi] := \{s \in S : M, s \models \varphi\}$$

( $[\varphi]$  is called the **denotation** of  $\varphi$ )

2. then compare with the set of initial states:

$$I \subseteq [\varphi] ?$$

## CTL Model Checking: General Idea [cont.]

To compute  $[\varphi]$ :

- ▷ proceed “bottom-up” on the structure of the formula, computing  $[\varphi_i]$  for each subformula  $\varphi_i$  of  $\mathbf{AG}(p \rightarrow \mathbf{AF}q)$ :
  - $[q]$ ,
  - $[\mathbf{AF}q]$ ,
  - $[p]$ ,
  - $[p \rightarrow \mathbf{AF}q]$ ,
  - $[\mathbf{AG}(p \rightarrow \mathbf{AF}q)]$



## CTL Model Checking: General Idea [cont.]

▷ To compute each  $[\varphi_i]$ :

- handle **boolean operators** by standard **set operations**
- handle **temporal operators** **AX**, **EX** by computing **pre-images**
- handle **temporal operators** **AG**, **EG**, **AF**, **EF**, **AU**, **EU**, by applying **tableaux rules**:

$$\mathbf{EG}\varphi_1 \iff (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{EXEG}\varphi_1)$$

$$\mathbf{E}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2) \iff (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathbf{EXE}(\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}\varphi_2)))$$

until a **fixpoint** is reached

## Denotation of a CTL formula $\varphi$ : $[\varphi]$

$$[\varphi] := \{s \in S : M, s \models \varphi\}$$

$$[false] = \{\}$$

$$[true] = S$$

$$[p] = \{s \mid p \in L(s)\}$$

$$[\neg\varphi_1] = S / [\varphi_1]$$

$$[\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2] = [\varphi_1] \cap [\varphi_2]$$


$$[\mathbf{EX}\varphi] = \{s \mid \exists s' \in [\varphi] \text{ s.t. } \langle s, s' \rangle \in R\}$$

$$[\mathbf{EG}\beta] = \nu Z. ( [\beta] \cap [\mathbf{EX}Z] )$$

$$[\mathbf{E}(\beta_1 \mathbf{U} \beta_2)] = \mu Z. ( [\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap [\mathbf{EX}Z]) )$$

# Case EX

- ▷  $[EX\phi] = \{s \mid \exists s' \in [\phi] \text{ s.t. } \langle s, s' \rangle \in R\}$
- ▷  $[EX\phi]$  is said to be the **Pre-image of  $[\phi]$**  (*Preimage*( $[\phi]$ ))
- ▷ Key step of every CTL M.C. operation
- ▷ Note: **Preimage()** is monotonic:  $X \subseteq X' \implies \text{Preimage}(X) \subseteq \text{Preimage}(X')$



## Case EG

- ▷  $[\mathbf{EG}\beta] = \mathbf{vZ}.\left([\beta] \cap [\mathbf{EXZ}]\right)$
- ▷ Greatest fixed point  $\mathbf{vx}.F(x)$  of the function  $F : 2^S \mapsto 2^S$ , s.t.
 
$$\begin{aligned} F([\varphi]) &= ([\beta] \cap \text{Preimage}([\varphi])) \\ &= ([\beta] \cap \{s \mid \exists s' \in [\varphi] \text{ s.t. } \langle s, s' \rangle \in R\}) \end{aligned}$$
- ▷  $F$  **Monotonic**:  $a \subseteq a' \implies F(a) \subseteq F(a')$ 
  - (Tarski's theorem):  $\mathbf{vx}.F(x)$  always exists
  - (Kleene's theorem):  $\mathbf{vx}.F(x)$  can be computed as the limit  $S \supseteq F(S) \supseteq F(F(S)) \supseteq \dots$ , in a finite number of steps.

## Case EG [cont.]

▷ We can compute  $X := [\mathbf{EG}\beta]$  inductively as follows:

$$X_0 := S$$

$$X_1 := F(S) = [\beta]$$

$$X_2 := F(F(S)) = [\beta] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_1)$$

...


$$X_{j+1} := F^{j+1}(S) = [\beta] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_j)$$

▷ Noticing that  $X_1 = [\beta]$  and  $X_{j+1} \subseteq X_j$  for every  $j \geq 0$ , and that  $([\beta] \cap Y) \subseteq X_j \subseteq [\beta] \implies ([\beta] \cap Y) = (X_j \cap Y)$ ,

we can use instead the following inductive schema:

- $X_1 := [\beta]$
- $X_{j+1} := X_j \cap \text{Preimage}(X_j)$

until a fixpoint is reached.



## Case EU

- ▷  $[E(\beta_1 U \beta_2)] = \mu Z. ([\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap [EXZ]))$
- ▷ Least fixed point  $\mu x.F(x)$  of the function  $F : 2^S \mapsto 2^S$ , s.t.
 
$$\begin{aligned}
 F([\varphi]) &= [\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap \text{Preimage}([\varphi])) \\
 &= [\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap \{s \mid \exists s' \in [\varphi] \text{ s.t. } \langle s, s' \rangle \in R\})
 \end{aligned}$$
- ▷  $F$  Monotonic:  $a \subseteq a' \implies F(a) \subseteq F(a')$ 
  - (Tarski's theorem):  $\mu x.F(x)$  always exists
  - (Kleene's theorem):  $\mu x.F(x)$  can be computed as the limit  $\emptyset \subseteq F(\emptyset) \subseteq F(F(\emptyset)) \subseteq \dots$ , in a finite number of steps.

## Case EU [cont.]

▷ We can compute  $X := [\mathbf{E}(\beta_1 \mathbf{U} \beta_2)]$  inductively as follows:

$$X_0 := \emptyset$$

$$X_1 := F(\emptyset) = [\beta_2]$$

$$X_2 := F(F(\emptyset)) = [\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_1))$$

...


$$X_{j+1} := F^{j+1}(\emptyset) = [\beta_2] \cup ([\beta_1] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_j))$$

▷ Noticing that  $X_1 = [\beta_2]$  and  $X_{j+1} \supseteq X_j$  for every  $j \geq 0$ , and that  $([\beta_2] \cup Y) \supseteq X_j \supseteq [\beta_2] \implies ([\beta_2] \cup Y) = (X_j \cup Y)$ ,

we can use instead the following inductive schema:

- $X_1 := [\beta_2]$
- $X_{j+1} := X_j \cup ([\beta_1] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_j))$

until a fixpoint is reached.




## A relevant subcase: **EF**

- ▷  $\mathbf{EF}\beta = \mathbf{E}(\top \cup \beta)$
- ▷  $[\top] = S \implies [\top] \cap \text{Preimage}(X_j) = \text{Preimage}(X_j)$
- ▷ We can compute  $X := [\mathbf{EF}\beta]$  inductively as follows:
  - $X_1 := [\beta]$
  - $X_{j+1} := X_j \cup \text{Preimage}(X_j)$

until a fixpoint is reached.



# Example 1: fairness




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \text{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$$

# Example 1: fairness

$[\neg C_1]$




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$$M \models \mathbf{AGAF}C_1 \text{ ? } \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1 \text{ ?}$$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EG \neg C_1]$ , step 0:




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

[EG¬C<sub>1</sub>], step 1:




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \text{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

[EG¬C<sub>1</sub>], step 2:




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \text{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EG \neg C_1]$ , step 3:




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG} \mathbf{AFC}_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF} \mathbf{EG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EG \neg C_1]$ , step 4:




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG} \mathbf{AFC}_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF} \mathbf{EG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

[EG¬C<sub>1</sub>], FIXPOINT!



N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical


User 1 User 2

$M \models \text{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \text{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$



# Example 1: fairness

$[EFEG \neg C_1]$ , STEP 0




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models AGAFC_1 ? \implies M \models \neg EFEG \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EFEG \neg C_1]$ , STEP 1




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EFEG \neg C_1]$ , STEP 2




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1    User 2

$M \models AGAFC_1 ? \implies M \models \neg EFEG \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EFEG \neg C_1]$ , STEP 3




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG}AFC_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}EG \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

$[EFEG \neg C_1]$ , STEP 4




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical

User 1 User 2

$M \models AGAFC_1 ? \implies M \models \neg EFEG \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness

**[EFEG¬C<sub>1</sub>], FIXPOINT!**




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1 ?$

# Example 1: fairness


$[\neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1]$



N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical    **User 1**    **User 2**

$M \models \mathbf{AGAF}C_1 ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EFEG} \neg C_1 ? \implies \mathbf{NO!}$

# Example 2: liveness




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      **User 1**    **User 2**

$$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1) ?$$



# Example 2: liveness

$[T_1]:$




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG} \neg C_1) ?$

# Example 2: liveness

$[EG \neg C_1]$ , STEPS 0-4: (see previous example)




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG} \neg C_1) ?$$

# Example 2: liveness

$[T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1]$  :




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1) ?$

# Example 2: liveness

$[\mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1)] :$




N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1) ?$

# Example 2: liveness

$[\neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1)] :$



N = noncritical, T = trying, C = critical      User 1    User 2

$M \models \mathbf{AG}(T_1 \rightarrow \mathbf{AFC}_1) ? \implies M \models \neg \mathbf{EF}(T_1 \wedge \mathbf{EG}\neg C_1) ? \mathbf{YES!}$

# Content

- ✓ Motivations and Goals . . . . .
- ✓ Representing transition systems as Kripke Models . . . . .
- ✓ Representing properties as temporal logic formulas . . . . .
- ✓ CTL Model Checking: general ideas . . . . .
- ⇒ Symbolic CTL Model Checking . . . . .
  - Conclusions, state of the art & research developments . . . . .

# The Main Problem of CTL M.C. State Space Explosion

## ▷ The bottleneck:

- Exhaustive analysis may require to store all the states of the Kripke structure, and to explore them one-by-one
- The state space may be exponential in the number of components and variables (E.g., 300 boolean vars  $\implies$  up to  $2^{300} \approx 10^{100}$  states!)
- State Space Explosion:
  - too much memory required
  - too much CPU time required to explore each state

## ▷ A solution: Symbolic Model Checking

# Symbolic Model Checking

- ▷ **Symbolic** representation:
  - manipulation of **sets of states** (rather than single states);
  - sets of states represented by **formulae in propositional logic**;
    - set cardinality not directly correlated to size
  - expansion of **sets of transitions** (rather than single transitions);



## Symbolic Model Checking [cont.]

- ▷ two main symbolic techniques:
  - Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs)
  - Propositional Satisfiability Checkers (SAT solvers)
- ▷ Different model checking algorithms:
  - Fix-point Model Checking (for CTL)
  - Fix-point Model Checking for LTL (conversion to fair CTL MC)
  - Bounded Model Checking (for LTL)
  - Invariant Checking
  - ...

# Symbolic Representation of Kripke Structures

## ▷ Symbolic representation:

- sets of states as their characteristic function
- provide logical representation and transformations of characteristic functions

## ▷ Example:

- three state variables  $x_1, x_2, x_3$ :

$\{ 000, 001, 010, 011 \}$  represented as “first bit false”:  $\neg x_1$

- with five state variables  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ :

$\{ 00000, 00001, 00010, 00011, 00100, 00101, 00110, 00111, \dots, 01111 \}$  still  
represented as “first bit false”:  $\neg x_1$

# Kripke Structures in Propositional Logic

- ▷ Let  $M = (S, I, R, L, AF)$  be a Kripke structure
- ▷ States  $s \in S$  are described by means of an array  $V$  of boolean **state variables**.
- ▷ A **state** is an **truth assignment** to each atomic proposition in  $V$ .
  - **0100** is represented by the formula  $(\neg x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \neg x_3 \wedge \neg x_4)$
  - we call  $\xi(s)$  the formula representing the state  $s \in S$   
(Intuition:  $\xi(s)$  holds iff the system is in the state  $s$ )
- ▷ A set of states  $Q \subseteq S$  can be (naively) represented by the formula  $\xi(Q)$

$$\bigvee_{s \in Q} \xi(s)$$

- ▷ Bijection between models of  $\xi(Q)$  and states in  $Q$

## Remark

- ▷ any propositional formula is a (typically very compact) representation of the set of assignments satisfying it
- ▷ **Any formula equivalent to  $\xi(Q)$  is a representation of  $Q$**   
 $\implies$  Typically  $Q$  is encoded by much smaller formulas than  $\bigvee_{s \in Q} \xi(s)$  !!!
- ▷ **Example:**  $Q = \{ 00000, 00001, 00010, 00011, 00100, 00101, 00110, 00111, \dots, 01111 \}$   
 } represented as “first bit false”:  $\neg x_1$

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \bigvee_{s \in Q} \xi(s) = (\neg x_1 \wedge \neg x_2 \wedge \neg x_3 \wedge \neg x_4 \wedge \neg x_5) \vee \\
 (\neg x_1 \wedge \neg x_2 \wedge \neg x_3 \wedge \neg x_4 \wedge x_5) \vee \\
 (\neg x_1 \wedge \neg x_2 \wedge \neg x_3 \wedge x_4 \wedge \neg x_5) \vee \\
 \dots \\
 (\neg x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge x_3 \wedge x_4 \wedge x_5)
 \end{array}
 \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} \dots \\ \dots \\ \dots \end{array}} \right\} 2^4 \text{ disjuncts}$$

# Symbolic Representation of Set Operators

- ▷ Set of all the states:  $\xi(S) := \top$
- ▷ Empty set :  $\xi(\emptyset) := \perp$
- ▷ Union represented by disjunction:  
 $\xi(P \cup Q) := \xi(P) \vee \xi(Q)$
- ▷ Intersection represented by conjunction:  
 $\xi(P \cap Q) := \xi(P) \wedge \xi(Q)$
- ▷ Complement represented by negation:  
 $\xi(S/P) := \neg \xi(P)$
- ▷ Containment represented by implication:  
 $\xi(P \subseteq Q) := \xi(P) \rightarrow \xi(Q)$
- ▷ Set equality represented by logical equivalence:  
 $\xi(P = Q) := \xi(P) \leftrightarrow \xi(Q)$

# Symbolic Representation of Transition Relations

- ▷ The transition relation  $R$  is a set of pairs of states:  $R \subseteq S \times S$
- ▷ A transition is a pair of states  $(s, s')$
- ▷ A new vector of variables  $V'$  (the **next state vector**) represents the value of variables after the transition has occurred
- ▷  $\xi(s, s')$  defined as  $\xi(s) \wedge \xi'(s')$
- ▷ The transition relation  $R$  can be (naively) represented by

$$\bigvee_{(s,s') \in R} \xi(s, s') = \bigvee_{(s,s') \in R} (\xi(s) \wedge \xi'(s'))$$

- ▷ Note: Each formula equivalent to  $\xi(R)$  is a representation of  $R$   
 $\implies$  Typically  $R$  is encoded by a much smaller formula than  $\bigvee_{(s,s') \in R} (\xi(s) \wedge \xi'(s'))$  !!!

# Example: a simple counter

```


MODULE main
  VAR
    v0      : boolean;
    v1      : boolean;
    out     : 0..3;

  ASSIGN
    init(v0) := 0;
    next(v0) := !v0;


    init(v1) := 0;
    next(v1) := (v0 xor v1);

    out := v0 + 2*v1;


```




$v_1$	$v_0$	$v'_1$	$v'_0$
0	0	0	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0



# Example: a simple counter [cont.]



$v_1$	$v_0$	$v'_1$	$v'_0$
0	0	0	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0




$$\xi(R) = (v'_0 \leftrightarrow \neg v_0) \wedge (v'_1 \leftrightarrow v_0 \oplus v_1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bigvee_{(s,s') \in R} \xi(s) \wedge \xi(s') &= (\neg v_1 \wedge \neg v_0 \wedge \neg v'_1 \wedge v'_0) \vee \\ &\quad (\neg v_1 \wedge v_0 \wedge v'_1 \wedge \neg v'_0) \vee \\ &\quad (v_1 \wedge \neg v_0 \wedge v'_1 \wedge v'_0) \vee \\ &\quad (v_1 \wedge v_0 \wedge \neg v'_1 \wedge \neg v'_0) \end{aligned}$$




# Preimage

- ▷ (Backward) preimage of a set:




- ▷ Evaluate one-shot all transitions ending in the states of the set
- ▷ Set theoretic view:  $Preimage(P, R) := \{s \mid \text{for some } s' \in P, (s, s') \in R\}$
- ▷ Logical view:  $\xi(Preimage(P, R)) := \exists V'. (\xi(P)[V'] \wedge \xi(R)[V, V'])$
- $\exists v. \varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \varphi|_{v=0} \vee \varphi|_{v=1},$   
 $\exists v_1 \dots v_k. \varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \varphi|_{v_1=0, \dots, v_n=0} \vee \varphi|_{v_1=0, \dots, v_n=1} \vee \dots \vee \varphi|_{v_1=1, \dots, v_n=1}.$
- ▷  $\mu$  over  $V$  is s.t  $\mu \models \exists V'. (\xi(P)[V'] \wedge \xi(R)[V, V'])$  iff,  
 for some  $\mu'$  over  $V'$ , we have:  $\mu \cup \mu' \models (\xi(P)[V'] \wedge \xi(R)[V, V']),$   
 i.e.,  $\mu' \models \xi(P)[V']$  and  $\mu \cup \mu' \models \xi(R)[V, V']$
- Intuition:  $\mu \iff s, \mu' \iff s', \mu \cup \mu' \iff \langle s, s' \rangle$

# Example: simple counter



$v_1$	$v_0$	$v'_1$	$v'_0$
0	0	0	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0



$$\xi(R) = (v'_0 \leftrightarrow \neg v_0) \wedge (v'_1 \leftrightarrow v_0 \oplus v_1)$$

$$\xi(P) := (v_0 \leftrightarrow v_1) \text{ (i.e., } P = \{00, 11\}\text{)}$$

$$\xi(\text{PreImage}(P, R)) = \exists V'. (\xi(P)[V'] \wedge \xi(R)[V, V'])$$


$$= \exists v'_0 v'_1. ((v'_0 \leftrightarrow v'_1) \wedge (v'_0 \leftrightarrow \neg v_0) \wedge (v'_1 \leftrightarrow v_0 \oplus v_1))$$

$$= \underbrace{(\neg v_0 \wedge v_0 \oplus v_1)}_{v'_0=\top, v'_1=\top} \vee \underbrace{\perp}_{v'_0=\top, v'_1=\perp} \vee \underbrace{\perp}_{v'_0=\perp, v'_1=\top} \vee \underbrace{(v_0 \wedge \neg(v_0 \oplus v_1))}_{v'_0=\perp, v'_1=\perp}$$

$$= v_1 \text{ (i.e., } \{10, 11\}\text{)}$$

# Preimage computation via OBDD's

Symbolic M.C. use **Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs)** to represent boolean formulas  $\implies$  allow for handling quantifiers very efficiently



## Application of the Transition Relation

- ▷ PreImage of a set of states  $S$  computed by means of quantified Boolean formulae
- ▷ The whole set of transitions can be fired (either forward or backward) in **one logical operation**
- ▷ The symbolic computation of PreImage provides the primitives for symbolic search of the state space of FSM's

# Symbolic CTL model checking

- ▷ Problem:  $M \models \varphi?$ ,
  - $M = \langle S, I, R, L, AP \rangle$  being a Kripke structure and
  - $\varphi$  being a CTL formula
- ▷ Solution: represent  $I$  and  $R$  as boolean formulas  $\xi(I), \xi(R)$  and encode them as OBDDs, and
- ▷ Apply fix-point CTL M.C. algorithm:
  - using OBDDs to represent sets of states and relations,
  - using OBDD operations to handle set operations
  - using OBDD quantification technique to compute Preimages
- ▷  $\xi([\varphi_i])$  computed directly, without computing  $[\varphi_i]$  explicitly!!!
  - boolean operators handled directly by OBDDs
  - next temporal operators **EX**: handled by symbolic PreImage computation
  - other temporal operators **EG, EU**: handled by fix-point symbolic computation

## General M.C. Procedure

```

OBDD Check(CTL_formula  $\beta$ ) {
  if (In_OBDD_Hash( $\beta$ ))
    return OBDD_Get_From_Hash( $\beta$ );

  case  $\beta$  of
    true:      return obdd_true;
    false:     return obdd_false;
     $\neg\beta_1$ :    return  $\neg$  Check( $\beta_1$ );
     $\beta_1 \wedge \beta_2$ : return (Check( $\beta_1$ )  $\wedge$  Check( $\beta_2$ ));
    EX $\beta_1$ :     return Prelmage(Check( $\beta_1$ ));
    EG $\beta_1$ :     return Check_EG(Check( $\beta_1$ ));
    E( $\beta_1 \cup \beta_2$ ): return Check_EU(Check( $\beta_1$ ), Check( $\beta_2$ ));
  }

```

# PreImage

```
OBDD PreImage(OBDD X) {  
    return  $\exists V'. (X[V'] \wedge \xi(R)[V, V']);$   
}
```

# Check\_EG

```
OBDD Check_EG(OBDD  $X$ ) {  
     $Y' := X$ ;  
    repeat  
         $Y := Y'$ ;  
         $Y' := Y \wedge \text{PreImage}(Y)$ );  
    until ( $Y' \leftrightarrow Y$ );  
return  $Y$ ;  
}
```



# Check\_EU


```
OBDD Check_EU(OBDD  $X_1, X_2$ ) {  
     $Y' := X_2$ ;  
    repeat  
         $Y := Y'$ ;  
         $Y' := Y \vee (X_1 \wedge \text{PreImage}(Y))$ ;  
    until ( $Y' \leftrightarrow Y$ );  
    return  $Y$ ;  
}
```

## A simple example

- ▷  $N$  boolean variables  $b_0, b_1, \dots$
- ▷ Initially, all variables set to 0
- ▷ Each variable can pass from 0 to 1, but not vice-versa
- ▷  $2^N$  states, all reachable
- ▷ (Simplified) model of a student career behaviour.

```
MODULE main
VAR
    b0 : boolean;
    b1 : boolean;
    ...
ASSIGN
    init (b0) := 0;
    next (b0) := case
        b0 : 1;
        !b0 : {0, 1};
    esac;
    init (b1) := 0;
    next (b1) := case
        b1 : 1;
        !b1 : {0, 1};
    esac;
    ...
```

# A simple example: explicit representation of the Kripke model




(transitive trans. omitted)

$2^N$  STATES



$O(2^N)$  TRANSITIONS

# A simple example: $OBDD(\xi(R))$



$2N + 2$  NODES


# A simple example: states vs. OBDD nodes [NuSMV.2]



## A simple example: reaching $K$ bits true


- ▷ Property  $\mathbf{EF}(b_0 + b_1 + \dots + b_{(N-1)} = K)$  ( $K \leq N$ )  
(it may be reached a state in which  $K$  bits are true)
- ▷ E.g.: “it is reachable a state where  $K$  exams are passed”

# A simple example: FSM



$\binom{N}{K}$  STATES



# A simple example: $OBDD(\xi(\varphi))$



$(N - K) \cdot K + 2$  NODES



# A simple example: states vs. OBDD nodes [NuSMV.2]



# Content

- ✓ Motivations and Goals . . . . .
- ✓ Representing transition systems as Kripke Models . . . . .
- ✓ Representing properties as temporal logic formulas . . . . .
- ✓ CTL Model Checking: general ideas . . . . .
- ✓ Symbolic CTL Model Checking . . . . .
- ⇒ Conclusions, state of the art & research developments . . . . .

## CTL Symbolic Model Checking – Summary

- ▷ Based on fixed point CTL M.C. algorithms
- ▷ Kripke structure encoded as boolean formulas (OBDDs)
- ▷ All operations handled as (quantified) boolean operations
- ▷ **Avoids building the state graph explicitly**
- ▷ reduces dramatically the state explosion problem  
⇒ **PROBLEMS OF UP TO  $10^{120}$  STATES HANDLED !**

# Symbolic Model Checkers

- ▷ Most hardware design companies have their own Symbolic Model Checker(s)
  - Intel, IBM, Motorola, Siemens, ST, Cadence, ...
  - very advanced tools
  - proprietary technology
- ▷ On the academic side
  - CMU SMV [McMillan]
  - VIS [Berkeley, Colorado]
  - Bwolen Yang's SMV [CMU]
  - NuSMV [CMU, IRST, UNITN, UNIGE]
  - ...

## Other Symbolic M.C. Techniques

- ▷ **Symbolic Model Checking for LTL**
  - based on conversion to fair CTL MC
  - same fixpoint techniques and OBDD technology as with CTL
- ▷ **Bounded Model Checking** for LTL
  - based on SAT technology
  - incomplete, though extremely efficient
- ▷ **Counter-example-guided-abstraction-refinement**
  - based on abstraction-refinement paradigm
  - based on a mixed SAT & OBDD technology
  - incomplete, though extremely efficient
- ▷ **verification of “timed” and “hybrid” systems**
  - based on timed & Hybrid automata
  - combine logical with mathematical reasoning
- ▷ ...

Lots of ongoing research!

## To learn more...

### Books:

- ▷ An essential book:

E. Clarke, O. Grunberg, D. Peled **“Model Checking”** – MIT Press.

### Slides:

- ▷ A full 100-hour course on formal verification & model checking:

R. Sebastiani **“Introduction to Formal Methods”**

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**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION**